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W e develop a unified model of the interactions among investors, fund companies, and fW1d managers. Vve show that the interplay between a manager's incentives from her compensation structure and caree-r 
concerns leads to a nonmonotonic (approximately U-shapcd) relation between her risk choices and prior per­
formance relative to her peers. Significantly outperforming (underperformi..ng) managers are less (more) likely 
to be fired in the future and are also more likely to increase relative risk. Ceteris paribu~, relative risk declines 
with the level of employment risk faced by a manager. Using a large sample of mutual fund managers, we 
find strong support for the hypothesized U-shaped relation between relative risk and prior performance. Our 
findings also highlight the importance of employment risk as the underlying driver of risk shifting by fund 
managers. Our thcorctica1 model tJlso generates additional hypotheses that link determinants of the ftmd flow­
performance relati~Jn <md managers' employment risk to their risk-taking behavior. Tn support, our empirical 
analysis shows that funds with higher expense ratios have less convex fund flow-performance relations and 
less convex U-shaped relations between relative risk and prior performance; funds with younger managers, 
'INho face greater employment risk, have more convex U-shaped relative risk-prior performance relations; and 
managers in larger fund families have lower incentives to engage in risk shifting, thereby le<Jding to a less 
convex U-shaped relation. 
Key words: mutual funds; asset flows; relative risk; ability; c<Jreer concerns; employment risk 
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1. Introduction 
We develop a theoretical model to analyze the effects 
of a fund manager's incentives on her risk-taking 
behavior. We show that the manager's incentives from 
her compensation, reputation concern.-,, and employ­
ment risk lead to a nonmonotonic (approximately 
U-shapcd) relation between her risk choices rela­
tive to her peers and her prior relative performance. 
Implicit incentives arising from employment risk play 
a key role in driving risk shifting by fund managers. 
We then empirically examine the risk-taking behav­
ior of a large sample of fund managers and find 
significant support for the predicted C-shaped rela­
tion between relative risk and prior performance. We 
also provide evidence in support of the importance 
of employment risk as a driver of risk shifting by 
fund managers. Our theoretical framework generates 
additional testable hypotheses that link determinants 
of the convexity of the fund flow-performance rela­
tion and managers' employment risk to their risk­
taking behavior. Ceteris paribus, factors that decrease 
the convexity of the fund flow-performance relation 
and/or the manager's employment risk decrease the 
convexity of the U-shaped relative risk-prior per­
formance relation. Consistent with these hypotheses, 
we empirically show that funds with higher expense 
ratios, funds with older managers, and funds asso­
ciated with larger fund families have less convex 
U-shaped relations. 
We develop a two-period model of a representative 
fund manager in an objective category (for example, 
aggressive growth, income, etc.) with a large number 
of funds so that a single ftmd's choices do not affect 
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the performances of funds. We consider a partial equi­
librium framework in which the benchmark is passive 
and represents an alternate investment opportunity 
available to investors with a risk that is representative 
of funds in the objective category. 
The incentives, of managers depend not only 
on their objectives but also on the objectives and 
actions of fund companies who employ them and 
the investors who provide capitaL Our framework, 
therefore, simultaneously incorporates the actions of 
the manager, the company, and investors. Because 
we focus on calendar-year risk-taking behavior, the 
period and the two subperiods in our model corre­
spond to a year and the first and second halves of the 
year, respectively. At the beginning of each year, the 
fund company chooses the fund's fee. The fund man­
ager chooses an observable portfolio (or strategy) for 
the fund at the' beginning of each half-year. Investors 
competitively allocate capital to the ftmd at the begin­
ning of each year based on their assessment of the 
rnanager's ability to generate expected relative return, 
which is the risk-adjusted expected return in excess 
of the benchmark. The competitive allocation of cap­
ital by investors generates a surplus for the ftmd. 
We adopt an "incomplete contracting" perspective in 
which the payoffs of the company and the manager 
in each year are determined through Nash bargaining 
over the surplus generated by the competitive alloca­
tion of capital by investors. The fund company can 
replace the fund manager at the end of the first year 
with another manager of higher perceived ability. 
The relative performance of the manager in each half­
year is the return (before costs and fees) in excess of 
the benchmark she generates during the half-year. For 
simplicity, we assume that the manager chooses either 
a "high relative risk" or a "low relative risk" portfolio 
strategy in each half-year, where relative risk is the 
standard deviation of the fund's relative performance. 
Consistent with the standard trade-off between risk 
and return, the high relative risk strategy also has a 
higher expected relative return. The proportions by 
which the fund's expected relative return is altered by 
changes·inits n~lative risk are observable to all agents. 
The ratio of the expected relative return to the rela­
tive risk-the "relative" Sharpe Ratio--:-is higher for 
the high relative risk strategy. The manager's ability 
is the lrue risk-adjusted expected rei a tive return she 
generates, which is the risk-adjusted expected rela­
tive return with respect to the hypothetical omniscient 
agent who knows the manager's ability. All agents 
have incomplete but symmetric information about the 
manager's ability. Investors rationally allocate capital 
by incorporating their knowledge of the manager's 
strategy choices. 
Consistent with previously documented empirical 
findings (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Sirri and 
Tufano 1998, Del Guercio and Tkac 2002), we show 
that the assets under management are increasing and 
convex in the manager's average perceived ability 
and the inflows of new assets into the furi.d are con­
vex in the fund's relative performance. The manager's 
payoff in each period that is determined by Nash 
bargaining with the company is affine in the assets 
tmder management. It is, therefore, also increasing 
and convex in her average perceived ability. We show 
that there exists a termination threshold such that the 
manager can be replaced ·with some termination prob­
ability if and only if her average perceived ability is 
below this threshold. The manager bears personal ter­
mination costs from being fired. The manager chooses 
the fm1d' s portfolio strategy in each period to maxi­
mize her expected future payoffs. 
Because our empirical analysis focuses on "calen­
dar year" risk-taking behavior, we theoretically exam­
ine the relation between the manager ' s relative risk 
choices in the second half of each year in response 
to her performance over the first half to maintain a 
tight link between the theory and the empirics. To 
pin down the manager's risk choices in the second 
year, we extend the model to allmv for the manager 
to receive a termina1 payoff at the end of the sec­
ond year-the payoff from her "outside options"­
that is increasing and convex in her average perceived 
ability. 
The manager's relative risk choices in the second 
half of the first year vary nonmonotonically in an 
approximately U-shaped manner with her relative 
performance over the first half. We also show that 
if there is no employn1ent risk, the manager always 
chooses high relative risk in the second half regardless 
of her prior performance. Therefore, implicit incen­
tives arising from employment risk play an important 
role in driving risk shifting by the manager. further, 
factors that increase the level of ex ante employment 
risk faced by the manager increase her propensity to 
lower relative risk at all levels of prior performance. 
The manager's risk choices depend on the interplay 
between the convexity of her payoffs in her perceived 
ability and her employment risk. Because the high rel­
ative risk strategy has a higher relative Sharpe ratio, 
the variance of the evolution of the manager's aver­
age perceived ability is higher if she chooses the high 
relative risk strategy. When the manager significantly 
outperforms her peers over the first half of the year, 
her probability of being fired in the future is suffi­
ciently lm-v that she prefers to exploit the convexity of 
her payoff structure by choosing the high relative risk 
strategy, thereby increasing the variance of the change 
in her perceived ability. VVhen she significantly under­
performs her peers, she is very likely to be fired ln 
the future, so she "gambles" by increasing relative 
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risk, thereby increasing the probability that her per­
ceived ability improves enough to exceed the termi­
nation threshold. At intermediate performance levels, 
the risk of future termjnation causes the manager to 
lower relative risk. Because the manager's terminal 
payoff is increasing and convex in her average per~ 
ceived ability and she faces no employment risk in the 
second year, the intuition above immediately implies 
that she always chooses high relative risk in the sec­
ond year. 
Our theory leads to three testable hypotheses. 
(i) There is a U-shaped relation between a manager's 
relative risk choices and her prior relative perfor­
mance. (ii) The presence of employment risk plays a 
key role in driving risk-shifting behavior, implying a 
U-shaped relation between a manager's choice of rel­
ative risk and her probability of future termination. 
(iii) Any factor that increases the manager's ex ante 
employment risk, ceteris paribus, lowers relative risk 
for all levels of prior performance. 
The intuition underlying the U-shaped relation 
betw-een relative risk and prior performance also sug­
gests additional testable hypotheses that link determi­
nants of the convexity of the fw1d flciw-performance 
relation and the manager's employment risk to her 
risk-taking behavior. Factors that increase the degree 
of convexity of the fund flow-performance relation 
increase the convexity of the manager's payoff struc­
ture. As a result, the manager's propensity to choose 
higher rdative risk increases at all levels of prior 
performance. However, the marginal propensity to 
increase relative risk is greater when the manager is 
either a significant outperformer or underperformer 
compared with the scenario :in which she is an 
intermediate performer. Hence, the D-shaped relation 
between relative risk and prim performance becomes 
"steeper" or more convex. On the other hand, factors 
that increase the manager's employment risk increase 
her propensity to lower relative risk. Her marginal 
propensity to lower relative risk is, however, greater 
when she is an intermediate performer compared 
with the tw-o extremes of prior performance, leading 
again to a more convex or steeper U-shaped relative 
risk-prior performance relation. The above arguments 
lead to the following additional testable hypotheses. 
(iv) Any factor that increases (decreases) the convexity 
of the fund flow-performance relation also increases 
(decreases) the convexity of the U-shaped relative 
risk-prior relative performance relation. (v) Any fac­
tor that raises (lowers) the level of employment risk 
for the manager .increases (decreases) the convexity of 
the U-shaped relative risk-prior relative performance 
relation. 
We empirically investigate our five testable 
hypotlwses using data from Morningstar Mutual 
Ftmds Principia on individual fund managers over 
the peTiod 1997-2002. We focus on calendar-year risk­
taking behavior in which we examine tl1e relation­
ship betw-een managers' relative risk choices in the 
second half of each year in response to their rela­
tive performance over the first half. Consistent with 
our predictions, we show a statistically and econom­
ically significant U-shaped relation between relative 
risk and prior performance. Consistent ·with the the­
ory, w~ _also show that ftmds controlled by younger 
managers, ~vho face greater levels of employment risk 
ex ante, choose lower relative risk, ceteris paribus. 
Next, we test the importance of employment risk 
in driving risk shifting by examining the relation 
betw-een the future risk taking of managers and their 
probabilities of future termination. We estimate the 
probability of future termination of a fund manager 
at any date and then examine the relation between 
the likelihood of choosing high relative risk and the 
probability of termination. As predicted by our the­
ory, we show a significant negative relation betvveen 
the probability of termination and prior relative per­
formance and a U-shaped relation between relative 
Tisk and the probability of termination. Therefore, sig~ 
n.ificant underperformers (outperformers) are more 
(less) likely to be fired and arc also more likely 
· to choose high· relative risk. Our empirical results 
arc robust when we (i) consider alternate classifica­
tions of mutual funds by their investment objectives, 
(ii) accOtrn.t for the effects of team-managed funds, 
and (iii) incorporate the possibility that some mcmager 
termination events are driven by retirements. 
finally, we empirically investigate the testable 
hypotheses that relate the convexity of the fund 
flow-performance relation, the manager's employ­
ment risk, and the convexity of the U-shaped relative 
risk-prior performance relation. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, vve show that funds with higher expense 
ratios have less convex fund flow-performance rela­
tions and less convex U-shaped relative risk-prior 
performance relations. We also find some evidence 
that funds with inexperienced managers who face 
greater employment risk have more convex U-shapcd 
relations. Finally, consistent with the implications of 
the theory, funds associated with larger fund compa­
nies have less convex U-shaped relations. 
Our study contributes to the theoretica1and empiri­
calliteratures that examine various aspects of the rela­
tions among mutual fund flows, fund performance, 
managerial incentives, and risk-taking behavior. Berk 
and Green (2004) analyze the determinants of the 
fund flow-performance relation. Because their pri­
mary objective is to explain the observed convexity 
in. the fund flow-performance relation, they do not 
model the fw1d manager ·as an agent distinct from 
the fund company (who represents the fund com­
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on her relative risk choices are, therefore, not the 
focus of these studies. Furthc1~ they predict a mono­
tonic, rather than U-shaped, relation between relative 
risk and prior performance.1 Another set of papers 
(for example, Heinkel and Stoughton 1994, Carpenter 
2000) investigates the effects of fund managers' incen­
tives on their risk~taking .behavior abstracting from 
the investors-fund company relation. These studies 
also do not predict aU-shaped relative risk-prior per­
formance relation. 
Gervais et al. (2005) develop a model of the actions 
of investors, fund companies, and managers to high­
light the advantages enjoyed by fund families in mon­
itoringfund managers. We differ from their study in 
that we focus on investigating the risk-taking deci­
sions of fund managers in response to their incentives 
but abstract from iss1..1es related to the sizes of the fund 
families that employ the managers. Dangl et al. (2008) 
also develop a unified model of fund investors, com­
pilllies, and managers. As in Berk and Green (2004), 
their theory predicts a monotonic relation between rel­
ative risk and prior performance. 
Our study also contributes to the empirical liter­
ature by showing (i) a U-shaped relation between 
a manager's relative risk choices and her prior per­
formance, (ii) the importance of employment risk 
in driving risk shifting by documenting a U-shaped 
relation between relative risk and the probability of 
future termination, and (iii) showing the effects of 
determinants of the convexity of the manager's pay­
off structme and employment risk on the degree of 
convexity of the U-shaped relation or the intensity of 
risk shifting. 
Brown et al. (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) 
empirically analyze the effects of convexity in the 
fund flm•l-performancc relation on managers' risk 
taking. Brmvn et aI. (1 <:J96) find that 01..1tperforming 
managers lower fatal (rather than relative) risk rela­
tive to undcrperforming managers.2 The predictions 
of our theory enable us to extend the empirical anal­
yses in these studies by using nonlinear specifications 
: Das and Sundaram (2002) and Ou-Yang (2003) analyze the effects 
of various compensation schemes on fund manag-ers' equilibrium 
portfolio choices. These sh1dies ulso do not predict a nonmonotonic 
(U-shaped) relation belween relative risk and prior performance. 
Furthe1~ we examine the effect of career concerns on managers' risk 
choices in a unified fmmework in which the interactions among 
investors, companies, and ll)anagcrs arc incorporated. Hodder and 
jachverth (2007) show that hedge fund managers reduce risk when 
they have to shut down hedge funds involuntarily but could 
increasL~ risk if the tennination decision is endogenous. 
2 Busse (2001) finds that outperforming managers increase total risk 
relative to underperforming- managers. Kempf and Ruen7.i (2008) 
show evidence of tournament behavior within mutual flmd fam­
ilies. IIuang et al. (2011) investigate the effects of risk ·shifting on 
fund performance. They find that risk shifting is either an indica­
tion of inferior managerial ability or is motivated by agency issues. 
to show that both outperformers and underperformers 
increase relative risk, whereas intermediate perform­
ers lower relative risk. 
Khorana (1996, 2001) and Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999) study the effects of manager turnover using 
empirical specifications that assume a monotonic rela­
tion between risk and prior performance. Kempf et al. 
(2009) empirically show that fund managers who face 
high employment risk reduce fund risk. Guided by 
our theory, we empirically show the effects of employ­
ment risk on risk taking controlling for the predicted 
nonmonotonic relation betw·een relative risk and prior 
performance. · 
We present the model in §2. In §3, we derive the 
manager's incentive structure. In §4, we derive the 
main testable implications of the theory. In §5, we 
present our empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
We provide proofs of all propositions in the online 
Appendix A. In the online Appendix B, we present 
an alternate model in which the manager's portfo­
lio choices are unobservable, but it leads to the same 
testable implications. We present the results of empir­
ical robustness tests in the oi1line Appendix C. The 
online appendices are available at http:// ww\.v.rmi 
.gsu.edu/faculi.y I subramanian.shtml. 
2. The Model 
We consider a particular investment objective cat­
egory (for exainple, aggressive growth, long-term 
growth) with a large number of funds so that we can 
focus on a represenf.ative fund without loss of general­
ity. The investigation of objective categories with large 
numbers of funds is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics of our sample. As in Berk and Green (2004), 
we consider a partial equilibrium setting in which 
the benchmark is passive and represents an alternate 
investment opportunity available to investors with a 
risk that is representative of funds in the objective 
category. 
We model the actions of fund investors, fund com­
panies, and fund managers. There arc two periods 
with dates 0, 1, 2. Each period is divided into equal 
subperiods that are defined by intermediate dates 0.5 
and' 1.5, respectively. Because we focus on calendar­
year risk-taking behavior, we hereafter refer to each 
period as a "year" and the tvvo subperiods as the first 
and second halves of the year. Figure 1 sho>>\'S the 
model timeline. 
The ft.md company chooses the fund's fee and 
investors allocate capital to the fund at the beginning 
of each year, that is, at dates 0 and 1. The fund man­
ager chooses the fund's portfolio at tl1e beginning of 
each half-year, that is, at dates 0, 0.5, 1, and 1.5. The 
manager has the ability to generate returns in excess 
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Figure 1 Model Timeline 
Fund company 
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half-year. There is imperfect, but symmetric, informa­
tion about the manager 's ability. Investors observe the 
manager 's portfolio choices and competitively allo ­
cate capital to the ftmd at dates 0 and 1 based on their 
assessments of the m anager's ability. The competitive 
allocation of capital by investors generates a surplus 
for the fund . The manager and the fund company bar­
gain ex post over the surplus generated by investors' 
capital allocation to determine their respective pay­
offs i.n each year. The fund company can replace 
the fund manager at date J if the manager's per ­
ceived ability is sufficient}y low. In our theoretical and 
empirical analyses, we foc us on the manager 's choice 
of the fund 's relative risk-the s tanda rd deviation of 
the h.md' s return in excess of the benchmark-in the 
second half of each year in response to h er relative 
performance- th e return in excess of the benchmark­
over the first h alf. 
We adopt the p e rsp ec tive of studies in the "incom­
plete contracting" literature in which explicit con­
tracts between the company and the manager are 
not enforceable and their respective payoffs arc deter­
mined through Nash bargaining. As discussed in 
this literature, explicit contracts may be impossible to 
enforce bec;:mse the m anager/s relative performance, 
portfolio choices, and reputation may be nonv erifiable 
by a third p arty such as a court of law. 
As a result of Nash bargaining, both the com­
pany and the m an ager receive n onzero prop ortions of 
the surplus generated by the competitive allocation 
of capital by investors. Consequently, the company 
and the manager both have incentives .to increase 
the surplus. f urther, because the company receives 
a nonzero proportion of the surplus that is de ter­
mined by the m an ager's ability, it also has incen­
tives to replace the incumbent manager with another 
manager of higher perceived ability to increase her ·· 
payoff. However, because outside investors earn com­
p e titive returns regardless of the manager 's ability, 
they have no incentives to incur the fixed costs asso­
ciated with replacing the manager. It · is, therefore, 
important to model the company and the manager 
as distinct agents for the m anager to face nonzero 
employment risk. 
We model the publicly observable relative perfor­
mance of the manager before operating cosls and man­
agement fees (·which are also publicly observable) in 
each half-year. The relative performance is defined as 
the excess return over the benchmar k earned by the 
manager before costs and fees over the halfcyear. Let 
R(t +0.5) denote th e return over the half-year [t, t + 
0.5]; t E {0, 0.5, 1, 1 .5} of the fund (Pefore operating 
costs and fees) and Rben.,hmark (t + 0.5) be the corre­
sponding return of the benchmark. The rela tive per­
formance of the manager over the half-year [t, t+O.SJ; 
t E {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5} is · 
r(t +0.5 ) = R(t + 0.5)- Rben~hu1ark (t + 0.5), 
t E {0, 0.5, 1, 1.3). (1) 
In our subsequent analysis, we directly model the rel­
ative perform an ce process r( ·)so that our results only 
depend on this process .. As noted earlier, there are a 
large number of funds in the objective category so that 
a particular fund's portfolio choices and performance 
does not.affect the p assive benchmark. 
At each date t E {0, 0.5, 1, LSI, the m anager invests 
the fund's assets in h er choice of p ortfolio or strat­
egy, which, for simplicity, is either a high relative risk 
st~ategy or a low relative risk strategy. Relative risk is 
defined as the standard deviation of the fund's rel­
ative performance, that is, the standard deviation of 
the fund's return in excess of the benchmark We can 
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deviation of the fund's return relative to the average 
return of all funds in the objective category. Tn other 
words, the definition of the fund's relative risk does 
not depend on whether its return is measured rela­
tive to the passive benchmark or with respect to the 
average return of all funds in the objective category 
(details available upon request). 
The fund's relative performance (before costs and 
fees) over the half-year [I, t + 0.5] is 
r(t+0.5)=lm(i)+rr(t)N, fE(0,0.5,1,1.5}, (2) 
where N is a standard normal random variable_ The 
normal random variables that determine the relative 
performance over the various half-years are indepen­
dent. We use the same letter to denote them to avoid 
cluttering the notation. 
ln (2), (T(t) = ITmax and m(t) = mmax if the manager 
chooses the high relative risk strategy, and (r(t) =a-min 
and m(t) = mmin if the manager chooses the low 
relative risk sh·ategy. The parameters, ifmax, mm<>x' 
(Tmin 1 fflmin are knOVvn COnStantS With !Tmilx > (Tmin; 
mmax > mmin > 0. The manager's strategy (or relative 
risk) choice is observable, and it is common knowl­
edge that the fund's relative performance is given 
by (2). However, as discussed earlier, the manager's 
strategy choice is nonverifiable and, therefore, non­
contractible. In the online appendix, we show that our 
implications arc robust to an alternate model in which 
outside investors cannot observe the manager's port­
folio choices. 
The expected relative return under the high relative 
risk strategy differs from the_ expected relative return 
under the low relative risk strategy. In other words, 
because the benchmark with respect to which returns 
are measured is noisy, relative risk contains a sys­
tematic component that affects the expected relative 
return. The parameter lin (2) is the manager's ability 
that is unobservable to all agents and is given by 
1= E1[m(t)-1r(t +0.5)], (3) 
\-\,·here E1( ·] denotes the expectation with respect to 
the hypothetical. omniscient agent who knows the 
manager's ability. lt follows from (3) that 
I ·- -1 ­1= mm._"Et[rmaxCt +0.5)] = mminEtirmin (t + 0.5)], 
t E {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5L (4) 
where rmax(t + 0.5) and rmin(f + 0.5) denote the 
fund's relative performances over the half-year if the 
manager choose the high and low relative risk strate­
gies, respectively. Hence, the manager's ability is the 
true expected relative return she generates in each half­
year under either strategy ·weighted by the risk adjust­
ment factor m;~ or m;;J, depending on ,.vhether she 
chooses the high or low relative risk strategy, respec­
tively. In other w1..Wds, the manager's abillty is the true 
risk-adiusted expected relative return she generates. 
All agents (including the manager) have a common 
prior assessment of the manager's ability at date 0 
that is normally distributed with mean tL(O) and vari­
ance s(Of, that is, 
Prior on 1~ N(JL(O), s(O?). (5) 
Outside investors care about the risk-adjusted 
expected relative performance of the fund. Consis­
tent with the above discussion, their valuation of the 
fund's relative performance under either strategy is 
where Etf I denotes the expectation with respect tci 
the information available to all agents at date t E 
{0, 0.5, 1, 1.5), which comprises the history of the 
manager's observed relative performance and her 
portfolio choices. In other words, analogous to the 
CAPM, outside investors value the fund's relative 
performance tmder either strategy as its conditional 
expectation weighted by the risk-adjustment factor 
m(t)-1• It follows from (2) that 
E;[m.;;~xrm«x(t +0.5)] = E1[m~Jnrmin (t +0.5)] 
(6) 
Hence, investors' valuation of the fund's relative 
performance under either strategy is equal to the 
manager's expected ability as perceived by all agents 
conditional on their information at date t E {0, 1, 2}, 
which we refer to as her average perceived ability or 
reputation. The manager's average perceived ability, 
P-(f), at any date is, therefore, the expected risk­
adfusted relative return she generates over the fol­
lowing half-year. Because the expected risk-adjusted 
relative return equals the manager's average per­
ceived ability regardless of the fund's risk choice, out­
side investors arc indifferent to the fund's relative 
risk. Our subsequent analysis shows that the man­
ager, in contrast, has incentives to alter the fund's 
relative risk to int1uence investors' assessment of her 
ability and thereby her payoffs. We henceforth drop 
the subscripts "max" and "min" denoting the fund's 
relative performances under the two strategies. 
By the above discussion, all agents are symmet­
rically informed and they rationally and correctly 
incorporate their knowledge of the manager ' s strat­
egy choices and the parameters (TmaX' mmax t (Tmint mmin 
in forming posterior assessments of the manager's 
investment ability based on their observations of her 
relative performance. Define 
s(t)2 = Vart[L], t E {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5}, (7) 
l 
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which is the variance of the manager's ability as per­
ceived by all agents at date t E [0, 0.5, 1, 1.5]. The 
follovving lemma describes the evolution of the man­
ager's average perceived ability and its variance. 
LEMMA 1 (Tt-ui EvOLUTION OF THE MA~AGER's PER­
CFTVF.D AHTT.TTY). 
(a) The manager's average perceived ability evolv es as 
follows: 
1:') CT(tfp.(t) + m(t)s(t)2r(t + 0.5)
f1. (t +O.~, = . 	 , 
O'(t)2 +m(t)ls(t)2 
t E {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5~. (8) 
The evolution of the manager's average perceived ability 
can be rewritten as 
p.(t + 0.5) = p.(t) + m(t)s(t)2 . N, 
.../0'(1)2 + m(t)2s(t)2 
= p.(t) + S)J(t)N(t), 	 (9) 
where N is a standard normal random variable. 
(b) The variance of the manager's perceived ability 
evolves as jiJllows: 
0 -)2 u(t)2s{tf (10)s(t+ .;) = ~ 
O'(t)2 + m(t)~s(t)2 
The following lemma provides a necessary and 
sufficient condition on the parameters (]'max' mmox' 
crmin ,-mmin that characterize the two strategies, which 
ensures that the standard deviation of the change in 
the manager's average perceived ability in any half­
year is higher Lmder the high relative risk strategy. 
LEMMA 2 (STANDARD DEVIATION OF CHANGE L\J 




is necessary and sufficient to ensure that the standard devi­
ation, 511 (t), of the evolution of the manager's average per­
ceived ability in haff-year [t, I+ 0.5] (see (10)) is higher 
under tl1e high relative risk strategy. 
Condition (11) implies that the expected relative 
return per unit of relative risk is higher for the high 
relative risk strategy; that is, the high relative risk 
strategy has a higher "relative" Sharpe ratio. Recall 
that because the bcnclunark is noisy, relative risk has 
a systematic component, so a change in relative risk 
leads to a change in expected relative return. Con­
dition (11) is required to ensure that the standard 
deviation of the evolution of the manager's perceived 
ability is higher under the high relative risk strat ­
egy because the manager's portfolio choices and the 
parameters mmin ' mlnaX' (J'mhv O'max are observable by 
outside investors. In the online appendix, we describe 
an alternate model in which the manager's portfo­
lio choices are not observed by outside investors. We 
show there that the standard deviation of the evo­
lution of the manager's. perceived ability is always 
higher tmder the high relative risk strategy without 
any additional conditions. 
3. 	 Func;l Size, Fund Flows, Manager 
Payoffs, and Employment Risk 
We first investigate the relationship -behveen fund 
investors and the fund company and derive the equi­
librium assets under management as well as the 
fund's fcc in each year. We then analyze the bargain­
ing game between the company and the manager and 
derive the manager's payoff in each year. Finally, >'Ire 
characterize the manager's employment risk by exam­
ining the company's decision to replace her at date 1. ! 
3.1. 	 The Allocation of Capital by Investors and 
the Assets Under Management 
As discussed in the previous section, diversified 
investors care about the risk-adjusted expected rela­
tive return of the fund. As in Berk and Green {2004), 
there are decreasing returns to scale in fund manage­
ment so that the fund's operating costs are increas­
ing and convex in the assets under management. '[() 
make the timeline of events concrete, the fund's oper­
ating costs are sunk and investors pay management 
fees at the beginning of each year. Because the market 
for capital provision is perfectly competitive, in equi­
librium, investors allocate capital to the fund tmtil the 
risk-adjusted expected relative return to investors net 
of costs and fees is zero. 
The fund's operating costs as a ftmction of the 
assets under management are represented by the 
increasing and strictly convex function C( · ): 10, oo)-+ 
ro, oo), and the marginal operating costs function 
C'( ·) satisfies C'(O) = 0, C'(oo) = oo. We further 
assume that C"' ( ·) exists and is strictly negative, 
that is, C'( ·) is strictly concave, which implies that 
although the fund's marginal operating costs increase 
with the fund's size, their rate of increase declines 
with the fund's size. The decline of the marginal oper­
ating costs with the fund's size could, for example, 
arise from economies of scale. 
PRoPosrno~ 1 (THE fuND's FEE AND AssETS UNDEH 
MANAGEMENT). in equilibrium, the fund's fee fopt(t) and 
the assets under management q"P1 (t) at date t E !O, 1} are 
given.by 
qopt (t) = (CT1 (2J.L(f)1)1,u(t)>O, (12) 
·opt 	 - [ C(qopt(t))]
j (t)- 2~-t(t)- qopt(t) 11-'(t)>tlt (13) 
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All our subsequent results only depend on the 
assets under management being increasing and con­
vex in the manager's average perceived ability. There­
fore, to simplify exposition, we henceforth assume 
that the manager's average perceived ability is posi­
tive so that the. fund has n~1nzero assets.3 For tractabil­
ity, we assume that the operating costs are given by 
C(q)=kq+gqlog(q), ·whereg>O;k:::O. (14) 
From (12), (13), (14), and because E1(l) = J.L(t), we 
obtain the following expressions for the equilibrium 
assets under management qopl(t) and the fee rpl(t) at 
date t E \0, l, 2): 
q"Pt(t) =llexp[((2J,L(t)))/g], ll =e (g 1 kl;gi 
(15) 
_fOP1 (t) = g I t E {0, 1 }. 
from (15), INC note that the fLmd's fee is a constant 
that does not depend on the manager's perceived 
abUity, which is consistent with a fund's fee not vary­
i1lg significantly over time.4 Hence, as in Berk and 
Green (2004), fund t1ows and the assets under man­
agement are the primary mechanism through which 
managers are compensated for their skills. Prom (14) 
and (15), the fund's operating costs and fees per unit 
of assets under management arc given by 
3.2. The ManageT's Payoffs 
The manager and the company bargain over the total 
payoff Y(t) = rP1(t)q0P1(t) = gq0P1(t) generated by the 
flow of assets at date t E {0, 1 f (recall from (15) that
rP1(t) = g is the fcc per unit of assets under man­
agement). Their respective payoffs are determined by 
Nash bargaining. If the bargaining process ends in 
disagreement, the company and the manager incur 
personal costs represented by proportions Dp, B E 
(0, l} of the surplus. Both the company and the man­
ager only incur costs in the current year lt, t+ 1) upon 
disagreement. We assume that 6 +oF > 1 so that there 
is a loss in total slliplus if the company and the man­
ager _cannot reach an agreement. The company and 
the manager arc risk neutral with zero discount rates. 
Tiw following lemma shows that the manager's pay­
off at the beginning of each year is affine in the total 
surplus. 
1 This entails little loss of generality as we show later because the 
manager is rcpl<tccd with high probability if his <tveragc perceived 
ability falls below a positive threshold. 
4 The fact that the equilibrium fee is constant in our model is, of 
course, a consequence of the parametrization (14). INc can, however, 
show that for a more geneml operating costs function satisfying our 
assumptions, the dynamic variation of the fund's fee is relatively 
small compared wil'h the dynamic variation of l'lw assets under 
rnanagetnent. 
LEMMA 3. The manager's pay(~(f P(t) at date t E {0, 1} 
conditional on not being replaced is 
(17) 
where h > 0 and c = 2/g > 0 are constants. 
The manager's payoff in each year is, therefore, 
increasing and convex in her average perceived abil­
ity at the beginning of the year. Because the company 
and the manager bargain over the surplus, the com~ 
pany also receives a nonzero proportion of the sur­
plus. Consequently, as we now show, the company 
has incentives to replace the manager with another 
manager of higher perceived ability and, therefore, 
increase its own payoff. 
3.3. The Manager's Employment Risk 
At date 1, the fund company can replace the manager 
with another manager of higher perceived ability. The 
company incurs search costs to find a replacement, 
and the probability of finding a new manager is a E 
(0, 1). If the manager is replaced, she incurs personal 
costs l"i > 0, that is, her fuhue payoffs upon leaving 
the fund are equal to her future payoffs if she were 
to continue with the fund less the costs B. (For exam­
ple, we could assume that the manager joins another 
identical fund after incurring search costs (5.)5 The fol­
lowing proposition describes the manager's employ­
ment risk. 
PROPOSITION 2 (TH:E MAl'\AGFR'S EMPT.OYMENT 
RrsK). There exists a constant threshold l~. such thai the 
manager is replaced at date 1 with nonzero probability a E 
(0, 1) if and only if her average perceived ability J.L(l).:::: lb. 
The presence of proportional search costs associated 
with finding a replacement ensures that it is worth­
while for the fund company to replace the incumbent 
only if her perceived ability is sufficiently low. We 
note that a is the probability of the manager being 
replaced conditional on her average perceived abil­
ity J.L(t) being below the threshold lb. Therefore, the 
probability that the manager is replaced at date t + 1 
as seen at date t is aProb1[,u(t + 1) < ld, where t E 
jO, 1) and Prob, denotes the conditional probability at 
date t. 
As in "reputation concerns" models, if the Inan­
agcr receives no payoff at the terminal date 2, then 
she is indifferent to her choices of relative risk in the 
second year because her payoff in the second year, 
P(l), only depends on her average perceived ability, 
J.L(1), at the beginning of the year. To pin down the 
cOur results also hold if the manager's personal costs from being 
replaced at any date are pmportional to her payoff at th2t date if she 
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manager 's relative risk choices in the second year, we 
assum e that th.e manager receives a terminal p ayoff 
from her "outside options." Note that th e ma nager's 
payoffs upon disagreement in the bargaining process 
with the compan y a t date t E {0, ·1} and her p ayoff 
from being replaced a t date 1 are essentially the pay­
offs she derives from her outside options a t th at d ate. 
Consistent with these p ayoffs b eing increasing and 
convex in the m an ager's average perceived ability, we 
assume that the manager 's terminal payoff a t d ate 2 is 
also increasing an d convex in her average p erceived 
ability JL(2) a t date 2, tha t is, 
P(2) = D (JL(2)) , (18) 
where D ( · ) is an increasing, con vex function. The 
incorporation of a termina l payoff for the manager 
pins down the m anager 's risk choices in the sec­
ond year but does not alter any of the model's main 
testable implication s that relate to the m anager 's rela­
tive r isk choices in the second half of the fir st year in 
resp onse to her performan ce over the first half. 
4. 	 The Manager's Relative 
Risk Choices 
The manager ch ooses the fund's relati ve ri5k in each 
h alf-year to maximize her expected future payoffs; 
th at is, her relative r isk ch oices solve 
sup E[ P(O)+P(l )-ol /rml=l l p.(IJ<I, +P(2)] 
v(! )e~v.,,;.,, "~=t· t E(O. 0.3, 1. 1.5 ) 
= sup E[P (O)+P(I) - a811'(l)<~~ + P(2)]. 
(l(t)E=["m~ ' rTm11 xJ, l'e{0 , 0 .5, 1, 1.51 
(19) 
The manager 's objective (19) incorpora tes the m an­
ager 's ability to alter the ftmd's relative risk in 
each hatf-year. Th e third term inside the expectation 
reflects the personal costs 8 > 0 that the manager 
incurs if she is fired at date 1 so that her future 
pi:lyoff is lowered from P(2) to P (2) - o. The indica­
tor function s l fired= l 1 J.< (l )<l,, reflect that the m anager is 
fired v1ith nonzero probability only if h er a vera ge per ­
ceived ability at d a te 1 is below the threshold lh . 
To maintain a tight link "'rith. our emp~kal an aly ­
sis, we examine the man ager 's relative 1isk choices in 
the second half of each year in response to her prior 
performance over the first half. The following propo­
s ition describes the man ager's relative risk choices in 
.the second h alf of year 2. · 
PRoPOSITIO N 3 (RELAnv.ll RisK OvER H A L F-YE AR 
[1.3, 2]). Suppose that condition (11) holds . The manager 
always chooses the high relative risk strategy in the half­
year f1 .5, 2] regardless of her performance over the fi rst 
half of the year [l , 1.5]. 
The manager 's p ayoff at the end of the second year 
is increasing and convex in her average perceived 
ability by (17), and she .faces no employment risk If 
cond ition (11) holds, it follows from Lemma 2 that the 
standard deviation of the evolution of the manager 's 
average perceived ability is higher under the high rel­
ative risk strategy. Consequen tly, it is optimal for the 
manager to choose high relative risk in th e half-year 
[1.5, 21 regardless of her p erformance over the first 
half of the year. If condition (11) does not hold, the 
standard deviation of the evolutionof the manager 's 
average perceived ability is higher under the low rela­
tive strategy, so it is optimal for the m anager to choose 
low relative 1;sk in the half-year [1.5, 21. 
We now de1ive the manager's optimal relative 
risk choice over the second half of the first year in 
response to her perfo rm ance over the first half. 
PRoPosrnoN 4 (RELATIVE R.lsK CHOicEs ovER HALF­
YnAR [0.5, 1]). Suppose that condition (11) lzolds. (a) I1zere 
exist two threshold levels P.roin t 11-max; 11-rrun :::: ILulOX of the 
manager's average perceived ability, JJ.(O.S), at date 0.5 
such that the manager chooses low relntive risk over the 
half-year [0.5, l] if JL(ll.S) E (/Lmin' J.l-max) and high relative 
risk otherwise. (b) Tf the manager faces no employment risk 
(a o = 0), she chooses high relat ive risk. 
Proposition 4 implies th at the m an ager's rela­
tive risk ch oice in the second h alf of the fil'st year 
:.>[0.5, 1] v aries nonmonotonically with her average p er­
ce ived 'ability at d ate 0.5. The nonmonotonic relation 
between relative risk and average perceived ability 
follow s from the interplay am on g three factors: {i) the 
manager' s p ayoff at date 1 is convex in her average 
p erceived ability b y (18); (ii) she faces employment 
risk at date 1 (Prop osition 2); and (iii) if condition 
{11) holds, the standard devia tion of the change in her 
average perceived ability is higher if sh e ch ooses the 
high rela tive risk s trategy (Lemma 2). 
Suppose that condi tion (11) holds so that the stan­
d ard deviation of the evoh.1ti0n of the manager 's p er­
ceived ability is high er under the high re la tive risk 
strategy. If h er average perceived ability at date 0.5 
is su fficiently high, her probability of being replaced 
at date 1 is low. . In this case, the man ager exploits 
the convexity of h er payoff structure by choosing the 
high relativ e r isk stra tegy. If the m anager 's average 
perceived ability at date 0.5 is low, the manager has 
" little to lose" and' therefore, gambles by choosing the 
high . re lativ e risk strategy to increase the probability 
that her average perceived ability a t d ate 1 will be 
a1:>ove the termination th resh old lb (see Proposition 2). 
A't intermediate levels of the manager 's average per­
ceived ability, the presence of employment risk makes 
it optimal for the manager to choose the conserva­
tiv e low rela tive risk strategy to reduce the probability 
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that her average perceived ability will fall below the 
termination threshold lt·· . 
Proposition 4(b) shows that in the absence ·(_)f 
employment risk, the manager a]ways chooses high 
relative risk because of the convexity of her payoff 
in her average perceived ability. Hence, employment 
risk plays a cn1cial role in driving ·uariations in relative 
risk choices, or risk shifting. 
By (8), tbe manager's average perceived ability at 
each date increases with her prior relative perfor­
mance. Proposition 4 therefore implies that under 
condition (11), there is a U-shaped relation between 
the manager's choice of relative risk in the second 
half of the first year and her performance over the 
first half. In our two-period model, the manager b 
"young" in the first year and "old" in the second. 
In this context, Proposition 3 implies that experi­
enced managers are more likely to choose high rel­
ative risk. If condition (11) in Lemma 2 does not 
hold, the standard deviation of the change in the 
manager's average perceived ability is higher under 
the low relative risk strategy. In this case, the rela­
tion beh·vcen relative risk and prior performance is 
inverted U-shaped. Although we cannot directly ver­
ify whether condition (11) holds in the data, our 
strong empirical support for aU-shaped relation in §4 
suggests that condition (11) holds at least on aver­
age in the data_ The alternate model presented in 
the online appendix, in which the manager's port­
folio choices arc not observed by outside investors, 
unambiguously predicts aU-shaped relation between 
relative risk and prior performai1ce without any addi­
tional conditions. 
ln the following discussion, we assume that condi­
tion (11) holds. By Proposition 2, the conditional proba­
bility that the manager >Vill be replaced at date 1 based 
on the information available at date 0.5 is 
Conditional Termination Probability 
= aP05 [,u(l)::; ld, (20) 
where the subscript on probability denotes that it is 
tl1e conditional probability at date 0.5. By (8), the 
manager's average perceived ability at date 1, ,u(l), 
declines with her average perceived abilityat date 0.5, 
fl(0.5). Hence, Proposition 4 directly leads to the fol­
lowing corollary. 
CoROLLAtn 1 (RELATIVE RrsK AND PROUAIHLITY 
OF FuTURE TEHMlNATlON). There exist threshold val­
ues Pmin' Pmax; Pmin :;:: p"'"' of the manaxer 's probability of 
future termination p such that the manager chooses the low 
(high) relative risk strategy if p E (Pnmv Pmax) and the high 
(low) relative risk stra/egy otherwise. 
The following proposition shows the effects of the 
de~n:e of convexity of the manager's payoff structure 
and her employment risk on the relation between rel­
ative risk and prior relative performance. 
PROPOSITION 5 (CONVFXl'rY, EMPLOYMENT RISK, AND 
RELATTVli Rrsr< CnorcEs). The intermediate interval uf 
value~; (.Umin' .Umdx) of the manager';:; average perceived 
ability at date 0.5 j(Jr which the manager clwoses low rel­
ative risk (see Proposition 4) decreases with the degree of 
convexity c of her payoff structure (see (18)) and increases 
·with the manager's employment risk aD. 
By the intuition for Proposition 4, the U-shaped 
relation between relative risk and average perceived 
ability arises from the interplay between the convex­
ity of the manager's payoff in her average perceived 
ability and her employment risk. An increase in the 
degree of convexity of the manager's payoff struc­
ture increases the manager's incentives to choose the 
high relative risk strategy. Consequently, the inter­
mediate range of values of the manager's prior rela­
tive performance over which she chooses low relative 
risk shrinks. An increase in ao increases the effects 
of the manager's "employment risk" on her choice 
of relative risk, that she chooses low relative risk 
over a wider range of values of her prior relative 
performance. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Testable Hypotheses 

The results in the previous section lead to the follow­

ing testable hypotheses. 

HYPOTILESIS 1. There is a V-shaped relation between a 
manager's (fund's) choice of relative risk and her (its) prior 
relative perj(mnance. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Relative risk declines with any factor 
tluzt raises the level of ex ante employment risk for the 
manager, ceteris paribus. 
HYPOTHESIS 3. A fund manager's probability of termi­
nation decreases with her prior relative performance. There 
is a U-shaped relation between future relative risk and the 
conditional probability ({future termination. 
Hypothesis 3 directly examines the importance of 
employment risk as a driver of risk-shifting behavior. 
The intuition w1derlying the U-shaped relative 
risk-prior performance relation and Proposition 5 
also suggest additional testable hypotheses. Ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the convexity of the man­
ager's payoff structure increases her propensity to 
raise relative risk at all leveJs of prior performance. 
Her marginal propensity to increase relative risk is, 
however, greater at extremes of prior performance, 
thereby leading to a more convex or "steeper" 
U-shaped relation between relative risk and prior per­
formance. On the other hand, an increase in the man­
ager's employment risk increases her propensity to 
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lower relative risk at all levels of prior performance. 
Her marginal propensity to lower relative risk is, 
however, greater at intermediate levels of prior per­
formance, thereby again leading to a more convex 
or "steeper" U-shaped relation. The above arguments 
lead to the following additional testable hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 4. Any factor that increases (decreases) 
the convexity ~f the ftmd flow-perj(Jrmance relation also 
increases (decreases) the convexity of the U-s!wped relative 
risk-prior relative performance relation. 
HYPOTHESIS 5. Any factor tlzat raises (lowers) the leveE 
of employment risk for the manager, ceteris paribus, 
increases (decreases) the convexity of the V-shaped relative 
risk-prior relative performance relation. 
5.2. Data Description 
Because our testable hypotheses relate to the actions 
of fund managers, our empirical analysis is at the 
individual manager level. The data ,.ve usc arc 
from January 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 
Morningstar Mutual Funds Principia. hom this data 
set, we obtain a sample of all the funds that are in 
existence as of December 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
and 2001.6 · Note that the sample also includes funds 
(along with their current and past managers) that 
were liquidated during the years 1997-2002 thereby 
mitigating survivorship bias. For each fund in this 
sample, Morningstar provides biographical informa­
tion and starting and ending dates for all managers 
who were associated with the flllld, that is, current as 
well as past fund managers. We obtain the biographi­
cal information on all managers who were associated 
with a fund from January 1996 until December 2001. 
For each manager, we collect the monthly returns of 
the fund(s) she manages over the time horizon con­
sidered. The observations, thus, are at the individual 
manager level. 
Following Chevalier and Elllson (1999), we use age 
as a proxy for a manager's experience and calculate 
age from either graduation or birth year. Because we 
do not have information on the birth or the gradu­
ation year for a significant number of managers, the 
·size of the sample is substantially reduced in tests 
where the manager's experience is an independent 
variable. We group managers in two different ways in 
our tests: 
(i) Investment obieclives: aggressive growth (aggres­
sive growth and small company fllllds combined), 
growth, and growth income. (growth income and 
equity income funds combined); 
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(ii) Morningstar categories (large growth, mid-cap 
growth, small growth, large blend, mid-cap blend, 
sri1all blend, large value, mid-cap value, and small 
value). 
MorningstCJ.r reports funds' data ai: the share class 
level. The different share classes of the same flllld are 
backed by the same portfolio of assets. Because we 
are interested in the risk-taking behavior of portfolio
managers, we aggregate multiple classes of the same 
fund tb avoid multiple counting.7 To build a database 
at the portfolio levet we weight eac~ ()bservation for 
the share classes by the total net asset of each class.8 
Table 1 presents- descriptive statistics for the funds 
in the sample grouped by investment objectives.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the man­
agers. There is substantial variation in the ages of 
managers in our sample, with the average age being 
approximately 45 years. The relative risk choices of 
the managers (the standard deviation of monthly
returns in excess of the median return of funds with 
the same objective) appear to be consistent with the 
objectives of the funds. Table 3 presents descriptive
statistics of manager turnover in our sample. As in 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999), we characterize a man­
ager turnover event as one where a manager is asso­
ciated with a fund in a particular year but is not 
associated with it in the following year and either 
manages a fund with fewer assets or does not appear
in the sample. The llllCOnditional average probability
of termination in anv year across the various fund 
classifications varies fro~l a low of 16.58% (182/1,098) 
· for the year 2000 to 23.02%, (259 /1 ,125) for the year 
1999. The overall termination probability is, therefore, 
almost 20'X,, which suggests that employment risk is 
likely to be an important determinant of manageria1 
risk choices. 
5.3. Results of Tests 
We first test Hypotheses 1 and 2 from §5.1 by exam­
ining the relation between future relative risk choices 
and prior performance. 
5.3.1. Relationship Between Future Relative Risk
Choices and Prior Performance of Fund Managers.
We follow a number of prior studies (Brown et a1.
1996, Chevalier and Ellison 1997) by examining
calendar-year risk-taking behavior. The dependent
variable in these tests is, therefore, each manager's
relative risk choice over the second half of each calen­
dar year. The relative risk is the'standard deviation of
7 To determine which share classes belong to the same portfolio, we 
us~ a matching algorithm based on names, and th~n we check the 
results with the asset turnover dqta. Multiple share classes belong­
ing to the ~arne portfolio have the same asset turnover ratio.
5 Index funds arc excluded from the sample. 
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Table 1 Selected Characteristics of the Equity Fund Sample: 1997-2002 Morningstar Mutual Fund Principia 
Number of End qlyear total Average return Average expense 
Year funds assets ($ million) (annual) (%) ratio (annual) (%) 
Panel A: Aggressive· growth (total number of funds: 2,249) 
1997 373 669.30 20.50 1.41 
1998 443 545.84 2.84 1.39 
1999 455 674.82 40.24 1.38 
2000 472 738.90 1.23 1.38 
2001 506 561.27 -2.76 1.36 
ove rail average 636.40 11.79 1.38 
Panel B: Growth (total numbe r of funds: 4,628) 
1997 651 944.48 25.27 1.31 
1998 775 1,077.78 19.56 1.30 
1999 913 1,261.24 29.88 1.29 
2000 1,038 1,200.56 -2.16 1.29 
2001 1,251 881.25 -12.78 1.25 
Overall average 1,069.64 8.63 1.28 
Pane l C: Growth and income (total number of funds: 2,294) 
1997 413 1,636.94 28.21 1.08 
1998 454 1 '903.46 17.16 1.07 
1999 471 2.121.97 13.38 1.09 
2000 487 1,920.14 -0.02 1.13 
2001 469 1,802.62 -7.79 1.11 
Overall average 1,883.27 9.65 1.10 
Panel D: All rnvestment objectives 
Total sam pie 9,171 1 '166.91 9.65 1.26 
Notes. The sample includes open-end U.S. equity funds' that have an objective of aggressive growth, growth, or 
growth and mcome, as provided by Morningstar Mutual Funds Principia January 1997-2002. Multiple share classes 
belonging to the same fund are aggregated at the portfolio level. Returns are annualized from monthly returns. To 
be included in the table, a fund has to exist for a whole year and have monthly returns and year-end total assets 
information available. In subsequent analyses, samples might be different due to different data requirements. Index 
funds are excluded from the sample. 
the monthly returns in excess of the category median 
over the half-year (tracking error). 
We make two points regarding our relative risk 
measure. First, standard deviations based on monthly 
observations can be relatively noisy. Although the 
estimation error can be reduced by using more fre­
quent observations (vve only have monthly data), 
such observations may still be contaminated by other 
sources of noise such as market microstructure noise 
that are smoothed out at more aggregate levels. Sec­
ond, the risk of a fund's portfolio can change due to 
active rebalancing by the manager or due to changes 
in the risks of the individual securities in the portft11io. 
From a theoretical standpoint, how risk changes occur 
is not important because· the manager ultimately cares 
about the risk of the overa II portfolio. In other words, 
the manager could achieve her target risk because the 
risks of individua1 stocks change· and/or by actively 
rebalancing the portfolio.9 · 
We denote the relative risk over the second half of 
the year for manager i in year t as (r?f. We also show 
~For these reasons, we believe that tests u~ing mutual funds hold­
ing data (for example, see Huang et al. 2011) would support our 
hypothl;'ses. 
specifications where '·ve control for the relative risk in 
the first half of the calendar year, which is denoted as 
(J"?i. In these tests~ multiple share classes associated 
with the same fund are aggregated at the portfolio 
level. (All our results hold if we treat individual share 
classes as independent observations.) 
The main independent variable is the manager's
standardized performance rank over the first half of 
each year. We denote the standardized performance
rank of manager i in tlw first half of year t as ru<;~~­
We compute the standardized rank by first determin­
ing the actual rank of the manager relative to other
managers in the same fund segment and then divid­
ing the rank by the number of managers in the seg­
ment. The standardized rank, therefore, takes values
in (0, 1 J with the top performer getting a rank of one. 
To test for a U-shaped relation, we also include the
square of the standardized performance rank SQRK~~Jt 
as an independent variable. finally, as in Chevalier 
and Ellison (1999), we include the logarithm of the 
manager's age (LnMAGE,, f) as a proxy for the man­
ager's experience.
We use pooled OLS regressions to test the relation 
between relative risk over the second half of each year 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the lndi11idua1 Manager Sample 
Relative risk(% ) 
Number of 
Year managers Manager age First semester (monttlly) Second semester (monthly) 
Panel A: Aggressive growth (tota l numbe r of managers: 4.028) 
1997 611 43.9 2.79 2.08 
1998 786 44.7 2.00 3.13 
1999 840 44.3 3.56 3.40 
2000 863 45.6 7.08 4.12 
2001 928 ~-1 4ill 2.95 
Ove rail ave rage 44.9 4.01 3.19 
Panel B: Growth (total number of managers: 8,005) 
1997 1,043 44.8 2.00 2.02 
1998 1,240 45.1 1.78 2.69 
1999 1,617 45.0 3.02 2.75 
2000 1,890 45.4 5.65 3.49 
2001 2,215 45 7 3 62 2.89 
Overall average 45.3 3.47 2.86 
Panel C: Growth and income (total number of managers: 3,950) 
1997 669 45.1 1.22 l29 
1998 750 45.5 1.13 l80 
1999 809 44.9 2.15 1.67 
2000 868 45.9 3.03 1.99 
2001 854 46.8 2.29 1.68 
Ove rail average 45.6 2.02 1.70 
Panel 0: All investment objectives 

















Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of our sample of individual fund managers obtained from Morningstar Mutual Funds 
Principia January 1997-2002. Multiple share classes belonging to the same fund are aggregated at the portfolio leveL The variable age 
is calculated either from the year of birth of the manager (if it is available) or inferred from the graduation year of the manager. Relative 
risk tor the first semester (second semester) is the standard deviation of monthly excess returns earned by the manager (relative to 
objective median in that month) over the first six months of a year (last six months of a year). 
and performance over the first half. Standard errors of Table 4 presents the results of our analysis. For 
coefficient estimates are corrected for clustering at the brevity, we only report the results for funds classi­
fund level. Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999), we fied by Morningstar categories because the results 
include dummy variables for the calendar year and are similar for funds classified by investment objec­
fund segment in all specifications. tives. In all five specifications, the coefficient of prim 
Table 3 Descriptive Slalistics ol Manager Turnover 
Panel A: Managers grouped by fund objectives 
Year Aggressive growth Growth Growth income Total 
1997 43 (293) 90 (470) 61 (311) 194 (1 ,074) 
1998 56 (309) 97 (474) 43 (301) 196 (1 ,084) 
1999 90 (334) 89 (485) 80 (306) 259 (1 '125) 
2000 50 (303) 92 (538 ) 40 (257) 182 (1 ,098) 
Total 239 (1 ,239) 368 (1 ,967) 224 (1,175) 831 (4,381) 
Panel B: Managers grouped by Morningstar categories 
Year Large growth Med1um growth Small growth Large blend Medium blend Small blend Large v~lue Medium valu e Small value Total 
1997 26 (112) 19 (122) 20 (81) 64 (264) 9 (78) B(54) 26 (149) 9 (93) 13 (121) 194 (1,074) 
1998 21 (123) 30 (139) 25 (85) 34 (228) 19 (90) 10 (77) 22 (164) 15 (73) 20 (105) 196 (1 ,084) 
1999 27 (148) 26 (120) 24 (100) 50 (233) 19 (76 ) 26 (93) 42 (169) 18 (84) 27 (102) 259 (1,125) 
2000 37 (170) 24 (111) 10 (115) 45 (233) 2 (53) 10 (68) 26 (184) 13 (71) 15 (93) 182 (1 ,098) 
Total 111 (553) 99 (492) 79 .(381 ) 193 (958) 49 (297) 54 (292) 116 (666) 55 (321 ) 75 (421) 831 (4,381) 
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics on manager turnover in our sample. In each year, we present the number of terminations and the total number 
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Table 4 Relative Risk Choices over the Second Half of Each Year and Performance over the First Half 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
'· 
Dependent variable: (}"?/-Relative risk in the second semester 
(J,: l _l.. , 0.50250"'* 0.49267"'* 0.45002"*' 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln TNA.•.t 1 -0.00049.' ' -0.00090''' -0.00055' " -0.00016 -0.00027 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.28) 
RKfi --0.02223"' -0.06595'"* -0.02520*" -0.02324"' -0.05858'" 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SQRKj1i 0.01937••• 0.05820··· 0.02185" ' 0.02021"' 0.05206"' 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln MAGE,_, 0.00333m 0.00229·· 0.00371'' 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.02) 
EXP,_, 1 0.48727'" 0.84495"' 
(0.00) (0.00) 
TLOADu_1 -0.52149''""' -1.02586"' 
(0.00) (0.00) 
TURNOVER1,r_1(x 1,000) 0.00001 0.00002 
(0.40) (0.25) 
FLOWi,t-1(% X 1,000) 0.00003 -0.00021 
(0.87) (0.35) 
Ln FAGEi 1 0.00057 0.00084 
(0.15) (0.11) 
TEAMI,t-1 -0.00076 -0.00169" 
(0.17) (0.02) 
Segment and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 (%) 53.66 24.73 51.87 50.14 27.24 
N 11.655 11,655 5,868 3,247 3,247 
Notes. This table analyzes the relationship between the relative risk choices of managers in the second half of a calendar year and their 
performance over the first half. The sample includes managers of non-index U.S. Equity Mutual Funds contained in the Morningstar Mutual 
Funds Principia January 1997-2002_ Multiple share classes belonging to the same fund are aggregated at the portfolio level. Funds are 
classified according to Morningstar categories. Tl1e dependent variable is the relative risk over the second half of a year t (a"/~'). The 
independent variables include the relative risk over the first half of the year t (0"2/J and the logarithm of the fund's total net assets at 
the end of year t- 1 (Ln TNA,,, 1) . Afund's fractional rank (RK)';) represents the percentile performance rank relative to other lunds with 
tile same investment objective in the same period and ranges from 0 to 1. Fractional ranks are defined on the basis of raw returns over the 
first semester within a fund segment for the year t_ To capture nonlinear effects we also include the squared term of a fund's fractional 
rank (SORK)';). Also included in the regressions 1s the logarithm of manager's age in year t (Ln MAGE, 1). annual expense ratio over the 
year t -1 (EXP, 1 _· ), total front- and back·end loads over the year t -1 (TLOAD; 1_ 1). turnover ratio over the year t- 1 (TURNOVER, 1 1). 
percentage new money into the fund i in year t- 1 defined as FLOW;, 1_. = [(TNA1 1_,/(1 + ARET,,t_,))- TNA1. ,_~J/TNA;, 1_2 , where 
TNA1 , 1 is the fundi's total net assets at timet -1, and ARET• 1 1 is the raw return of fundi in year t -1, and logarithm of fund's age in 
year t (Ln FAGE;)· TEAM1,1 1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the fund is managed by a team rn year t -1. The regressions 
1nclude fund segment and year dummies. The regress1on coefficients are estimated using pooled OLS regressions. The standard errors 
of the estimates are corrected for clustering at the fund level (Rogers 1994). p-values are reported in parentheses. 
.... ~· .and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two~tailed tests), respectively. 
performance, RKl~;, is significantly negative, whereas 
the coefficient of the squared prior performance rank, 
SQRK):{, is significantly positive, suggesting the pres­
ence of a U-shaped relation between future relative 
risk and prior performance. An examination of the 
coefficients reveals that the minimum of d1.e U-shape 
occurs in the interior of the range of performance 
ranks. lienee, the relation between future relative risk 
and prior performance is, in fact, U-shaped over the 
observed range of manager performance. In all spec­
ifications where prior relative risk, lr,UJ, is included 
as a control variable, its coefficients ar'e positive and 
significant, indicating that there is a positive relation 
between relative risk over the first and second halves 
of each year. From Table i, the mean relative risk in 
the second half-year is 2.65%. The coefficients of RK)1~ 

and SQRK~~ ; in specification (4) suggest that the ma~­

agers wl1o choose the lowest relative risk choose a 

level that is 50'X, (as a proportion of the mean rela­

tive lisk) lower than the worst performers and 38% 

lower than the best performers, which indicates that 

il1e U-shape is economically significant. 

In models (3)-(5), the coefficients of the logarithm 

of the manager's age are positive and significant. 

The manager's experience (proxied by age), therefore, 

increases risk taking over the entire range of prior per­

formance. The positive effect of the manager's expe-­

rience on level of relative risk taking in the second 
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part of the year is, therefore, consistent with Hypothe­
sis 2. According to our results, experienced managers 
are less likely to be replaced and, ceteris paribus, are 
more prone to increase relative risks. In subsequent 
te~ts, we will show that 1nore experienced 1nanagers 
have lower termination probabilities. 
The specifications in Table 4 include "fund seg­
ment" and "year" durrunies following earlier related 
studies such as Chevalier and Ellison (1999). In 
Tables 4-A and 4-B in the online Appe11dix C, we 
show specifications that additionally include man­
ager, fund, or fund family fixed effects·. The U-shaped 
relation is statistically and economically significant as 
in Table 4. The coefficients of the log of the man­
ager's age are no longer statistically significant at 
conventional levels. There are a number of possible 
(related) reasons for the lowering of statistical signif­
icance. First, because the "cross-sectional" dimension 
of our panel data set is large relative to the "time­
series" dimension, the inclusion of manager/fund 
fixed effects greatly increases "sampling variability" 
and, therefore, the ~tandard errors of estimated coef­
ficients. Including fixed effects INhen time-series vari­
ation is not significant relative to the cross~sectionaJ 
variation may result in insignificant coefficients even 
if the actual relation is significant. Second, because 
the log of the manager's age is slowly varying over 
the time period of the sample, the inclusion of man­
ager fixed effects causes the coefficients of the log of 
manager age to be poorly identified. Third, in spec­
ifications that include the manager's age, the sam­
ple size is significantly lowered. The inclusion of 
manager/fund/fund family effects, therefore, further 
reduces statistical power. 
We conduct several additional tests to examine the 
robustness of the results of Table 4. To conserve space, 
we present the results of many of these tests in 
Tables 4-C-4-F in the online Appendix C. We describe 
the findings from these tests here. First, our previ­
ous tests controlled for the relative risk in the first 
semester to mitigate the possibility that the U-shaped 
relation is driven by funds that persistently devi­
ate more from the benchmark and, thereby, achieve 
returns in the tails of the distribution of relative per­
formance. To investigate this possibility, we divide the 
sample into three groups according to their relative 
risk levels in the first semester (i.e., low, medium, and 
high relative risk level). We study the risk-shifting 
behavior of funds in each group (Table 4-C). The 
evidence is consistent with the results of Table 4. 
Second, the previous tests do not differentiate funds 
according to their organizational structure (individ­
ual manager or team) and we treat inultiple man­
agers for a single fund as separate observations. In
a team-managed mutual fund, it is not clear how 
 
the incentives and employment risk affect each indi­
vidual member of a team. To address this issue, we 
repeat our previous analysis for the subsample of 
individually managed mutual funds and find simi­
lar results (Table 4-D). TI1ird, we repeat our analy­
sis with the full sample (individually managed and 
team-managed funds) with a team dummy variable 
and its interactions with the other major explanatory 
variables. In all the tests, the coefficients of the team 
dummy variable and its interactions are not signifi­
cant and do not affect the shape of, tlle relative risk­
prior performance relation or the contributi(m of lnan­
ager's experience to the level of risk choice. Fourth, 
Table 5 Determinants cf Em~lcymenl Risk 
Morningstar categories 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: TERM;.1-Managenal termination dummy 




LnMAGE1, 1 -1.3961•" 1.5303*•· 
{0.00) (0.00) 
FLOWI,/-1 -0.1735" -0.1813" 
(0.03) . (0.03) 




Segment arid year dummies YES YES 
Pseudo R2 (%) 1.34 1.57 
N 2,291 2,252 
Notes. This table repo rts the results of estimating, at the beginning of any 
year, the probability of termination of the manager over the next year using 
logit regressions with year and segment dummies. The stand ard errors of the 
estimates are co rrected for clustering at the fund level. Funds are claSSified 
accordtng to their Morningstar categories (large growth, medium growth, 
small growtll, large blend, medium blend, small blend, large value, medium 
value, and small value). Multiple share classes belonging to the same fund 
are aggregated at the portfolio level. The dependent variable is a dummy 
vanable that equals 1 when the manager is replaced during a given year 
(TERM,,). A fund's fractional rank (RK1, 1 d represents its percentile perfor­
mance relative to other funds in the same segment and ranges from 0 to 1 
where 0 indicates the bottom performer. In the table, fractional ranks are 
defined on the basis of a fund's one·year raw returns within afund segment 
for year t- 1. We include in the regression the annual expense ratio for 
year t -1 (EXP;, 1 ), the risk in year t -1 (£T,. 1_ 1) is the standard devia­
tion of the monthly returns in excess of the median monthly return for the 
fund's segment in year t- 1, and the logarithm of the manager's age in 
year t (Ln MAGE,. 1). The variable FLOW,,,_, is the dollar amount (in billion) 
of new money into t11e fund i in year t - 1 and is defined as FLOW; ,_1 = 
(TNA,, 1 .;!(1 +ARET1,~_ 1 )) - TNAu_2 , where TNA,,,_1 is the fundi's total net 
assets at the end of year t and ARET,, 1 is the raw return of fund i in year 
t --' 1. The variable AGE601., equals one when a manager's age is above 60, 
zero otherwise. The last two rows contain the pseudo R' and the number of 
observations N. p-values are reported in parentheses. 
*", '*, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two­
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we test for the U-shaped relation betvveen future rel­
ative risk and prior performance using piecewise lin­
ear specifications in.stcad of a quadratic specificatii:m 
(Table 4-E). We consider both three-segment and five­
segment piecewise linear specifications. The results of 
these test'> provide further evidence that the re1ation­
ship between relative risk and pt;or performance is, 
indeed, U-shaped. Finally, w·e carry out robustness 
tests. using data at the fund-year level (Table 4-F). 
Hence, multiple observations for various managers 
belonging to the same fund are grouped into one 
unique observation. As a proxy for managerial expe­
rience we adopt the log of the average managers' 
age belonging to the same fund (LnAvMAGEu ). The 
results are consistent with our previous evidence and 
support our Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
5.3.2. The Manager's Employment Risk. We now 
directly test the importance of employment risk in 
d riving risk shifting by fund managers. We estimate 
the probability of futme termination for a fund man­
" I ager using a procedure similar to that in Chevalier 
' and Ellison (1999). At the begi.J.u1.i.ng of each year, we 
estimate . the probability that the manager is termi­
nated by the end of the year; that is, the manager 
is not associated with the fund in the following year 
· and either manages a fund with fewer assets or disap­
pears from the sample altogether. We use logit anal­
ysis (with standard errors corrected for clustering at 
the fund level) to estimate this probability as a func­
tion of the manager's prior relative performance. We 
control for the prior relative risk choice of the man­
ager, £r;, 1_ 1, the manager's experience (proxied by her 
age), and p revious fund inflows. 
Table 5 reports the results of our analysis. In all the 
specifications, there is a significant negative relation 
between the probability of termination and prior per­
formance and a negative relation between the prob­
ability of termination and the manager 's experience. 
Follo>ving Khorana (1996) we also study the effect 
of past inflows on terminations (FLOW;, 1_ 1). Our 
results document that past inflows are an important 
determinant of managerial replacement decisions. To 
acco unt for the possibility that some of our man­
agerial departures may be motiva ted by retirements 
and not terminations, w e include a dummy vari­
able for m anagers with an age equal or above sixty 
(AGE60;, 1). As shown i.J.1 specification (2), retirement 
decisions do not appear to drive our res ults. In fact, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is insignificant. 
Finally, our empirical evidence shows that the fund's 
expense ratio does not have a significant effect on 
the manager 's termination probability. Overall, the 
results of Tables 4 and 5 together support our testable 
Hypotheses l and 2 in §5.1. 
. 5.3.3. Relationship Between Relative Risk 
Choices and the Probability of Termination. The 
results of Table 4 document a U-shaped rela tionship 
between futLLre relative risk choices and p1ior relative 
performance. We now test Hypothesis 3 in §5.1 by 
Table 6 Relationship Between Future Relative Risk and Termination Probability 
Morningstar categories 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: au-Future relative ri sk 
P_TERM;,1_ 1 -0.09418''" - 0.06893'" . 0.111 18- · - 0.08821··· 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
SOP_TERM11_. 0. 16 152~ · 0.1 2102'' 0.18724'" 0.15285" * 
(0. 01) (0.04) (0.01') (0.01) 
FLOW,! 1 - 0.00185 ''" 0.001 70' '" 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Segment and year dumm ies YES YES YES YES 
R2 (%) 31 .53 30.93 31 .53 30.93 
N 2,291 2,252 2,291 2.252 
Notes. This table presents the relationship between future relative risk choicP.s and estimated te rmination pro babilities from Table 5. 
Funds are classified according to thP.ir Morningstar categories (large gro,.'!tll, medium growth, small growth, large blend, med ium 
blend. small blend, large value, mediu m value, and small value). Multiple share classes belonging to the same fund are aggregated 
at the portfolio level. The regression coefficients are estimated using pooled OLS regressions with year and fund segment dummies. 
The standard errors of the estimates are corrected for clustering at the fu nd level (Rogers 1994). The dependent variable (u,_, ) is the 
standard deviation of the monthly returns in excess of the median monthly return tor the funu's segment during the current yea r. In 
specifications (1) and (2), the ind ependent variabl e is the predicted termination pro bability (P _TE RM, 1_d from t!1e corresponding 
specification in Table 2. vVe also include the squared termination probabilitl' (SOP_TERM,, ~-· ). In specifications (3) and (4), as an 
addit ional explanatory variable we add the variable FLOW, , 1 is the dollar amount (in billion} of new money into the fund i in year 
1~- 1 and is defined as FLOW1 1_ 1 = (TNAu - / ( 1 +AR ET,_, _1)} ~ TNA, •-; where TNA:.• , is lhdund i's total net assets at time I - 1, 
and ARET, !-I is the raw return of funcl i in period I - 1. The last two rows contain thHR2 and the number of observations fl/.p·values 
are reported in parentheses. 
,._. · •, and ' 1ndicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed t~, ts ) , respectively. 
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Table 7 Determinants ot Risk Shilling 
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Notes. The table analyzes the effects of determinants of the fund flow-pe rformance relation and employment risk on the relationship 
between the future risk choices and prior performance of managers. The sample includes managers of non-index U.S. Equity 
Mutual Funds contained in the Morningstar Mutual Funds Principia January 1997-2002. Multiple share classes belonging to the 
same fund are aggregated at the portfolio level. Funds are classified according to their Morningstar category. The regression 
coefficients are estimated using pooled OLS regressions. The standard errors of the estimates are corrected for clustering at the 
fund level (Rogers 1994). The dependent vanable is the relative risk over the second semester of year t (cr/;1). The independent 
variables include the relative risk over the first semester of the year t (a"t(l and the logarithm of the fund t~tal net assets in the 
previous year (Ln TNA,,_J!. Afund's fractional rank (RK):!l represents the percentile performance rank of the fund relative to other 
funds with the same investment objective in the same penod and ranges from 0to 1. Fractional ranks are defined on the basis, of 
raw returns over the first semester within a fund segment for the year t. To capture nonlinear effects we also include the squared 
term of a fund's fractional rank (SQRK)1)). Also included in the regressions are the annual expense ratio for year t- 1 (EXP , ,_.), 1
the logarithm of manager's age in year t (Ln MAGE,), and adummy variable that takes the value of one 1f the fund family has total 
assets under management above the median fam1ly size for year t- 1 (FAMILY, ,_1). The last two rows contain the R< and the 
number of observations N. p-values are reported in parentheses. 
' '' , ·•, and ' indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tai led tests), respectively. 
investigating the relationship bctvvccn a fund man­
ager's relative risk choices and her probability of 
termination from the fund in the future. 
For each specification in Table 5, we infer the man­
ager's probability of termination, P _TERM;, _ , 1 1 and 
then examine the relation between her future relative 
risk choice and her probability of termination. The 
results of the analysis when managers are grouped 
by Morningstar categories are reported in Table 6. In 
all four specifications, we find a negative and signif­
icant coefficient on P _TERM,, t 1 and a positive and 
significant coefficient on SQP_TERivli, _ 1 1 suggesting 
that there is a sig11ificant U-shaped relationship 
between the likelihood of choosing high relative risk 
in the future and the termination probability. An 
examination of the coefficients of P _ TERMu_1 and
SQP~TERM;, 1..1 reveals that the minimum of the 
U-shape occurs in the interior of the possible range 
[0', 1] of termination probabilities. Combined with the 
results of Table 5, these findings imply that outper­
forming (underperforming) managers are less (more) 
likely to be fired and also choose higher relative risk. 
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In summary, Table 6 supports Hypothesis 3 and show 
the importance of employment risk in driving risk 
taking by fund managers. 
5.3.4. Determinants of Risk Shifting. We nmv 
empirically investigate Hypotheses 4 and 5 in §5.1 
that relate determinants of the convexity of the fund 
flow-performance relation and employment risk to a 
manager's risk-taking behavior. 
We run tests very similar to those of previous stud­
ies such as Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) to analy7.e the relation between 
the dollar inflows of nev1r assets into a fund and its 
prior performance. We consider dollar flows because 
they directly determine the manager's compensation. 
Using both quadratic and piecewise linear specifica­
tions, we confirm that the relation is convex. Further, 
the degree of convexity of the fund flow-performance 
relation decreases with the fund's expense ratio. 
Because the results are consistent witl1 those reported 
in previous literature, we do not report them for 
brevity. 
Gervais et al. (2005) show that funds associated 
with larger fund companies have less convex fund 
flow-performance relations. Their results also suggest 
· that managers of such funds have less incentive to 
engage in risk shifting to influence investors' percep­
tion of their abilities. Both the above effects predict 
a less convex U-shaped relation between relative risk 
and prior performance. Consequently, our theory pre­
dicts that fund company size has a negative effect on 
the convexity of the U-shaped relation. 
Table 7 examines how the key factors that affect the 
convexity of the fund flow-performance relatit1n and 
employment risk-the expense ratio, the size of the 
fund family, and the manager's age-affect the degree 
of convexity of the U-shapcd relative risk-prior per­
formance relation. First, we note that, in general, the 
coefficient of prior performance, RK?~, is significantly 
negative, whereas the coefficient of the squared prior 
performance rank, SQRK~~;, is significantly positive. 
The U-shaped relation behveen relative risk and prior 
performance is, therefore, quite robust to the specifi­
cations used in these tables. 
In specification (1), the coefficients of the interaction 
between the squared prior performance rank and the 
expense ratio and the interaction bet>vecn the squared 
prior performance rank and the manager's age are 
negative and significant. The fund's expense ratio and 
the manager's experience (proxled by age) therefore 
both lower the degree of convexity of the U-shaped 
relation. In specifications (2) and (3), we sec that fam­
ily size has a negative effect on the convexity of the 
U-shaped relation between relative risk .:md prior per­
formance, which is consistent with our prPdiction. 
Furthermore, the expense ratio continLtes to have a 
negative effect on the convexity of the U~shaped rela­
tion. In specification (4), some coefficients become sta­
tistically insignificant perhaps because of the signif­
icant reduction in the size of the sample when the 
manager's age is included as an independent variable. 
6. Conclusions 
We theoretically and empirically examine the effect of 
incentives arising from compensation structures and 
career concerns on the risk-taking behavior of fund 
managei·s. vVe show that the interplay between a man­
ager's incentives leads to aU-shaped relation between 
her risk choices and prior performance relative to her 
peers. Implicit incentives arising from employment 
risk play a key role in driving this nonmonotonic 
relation. 
Our empirical tests confirm the existence of a 
U-shaped relation between future relative risk and 
prior relative performance. Consistent With the the­
ory, vve also shovv that older managers, who face 
lower employment risk, choose higher relative risk, 
ceteris paribus. We also document, for the first time, 
a U-shaped relation between a manager's like~ihood 
of choosing high relative risk and her probabillty of 
future termination. Therefore, we empirically estab­
lish the importance of employment risk as a driver 
of risk shifting by fund managers. Finally, we show 
empirical support for the additional testable hypothe­
ses suggested by our theory that link determinants of 
the convexity of the fund flow-performance relation 
and employment risk to the degree of convexity of the 
U-shaped relative risk-prior performance relation. 
Acknowledgments 
Earlier versions of this paper circulated under the titles "Rel­
ative Risk Choices by Mutual Ftmd Managers" and "Com­
pcns<Jtion, Career Concerns, <Jnd Relative Risk Choices by 
MutU<11 l;und M<m<Jgers." 'fhe <1Uthors thank two <mony­
mous referees; Wei Xiong (the department editor); and sem­
inar audiences at the 2007 Western Finance Association 
Meetings (Big Sky, :v!T), lhe 2005 Financial Management 
Association Korth American Meetings (San Antonio, Texas), 
the 2005 \1\'orld Congress of the Bachelier Finance Society 
(Chicago, lllinois), the University of Colorado (Uoulder), 
the lndian Institute of Management (Bangalore), Syracuse 
University, the University of Paris (Dauphine), and Geor­
gia State University. l'hc authors arc also grateful to Glem1 
Boyk, Keith Brown, Conrad Ciccotello, Stephan Dieck­
maml., Michael Gailmeyer, llan Guedj, Anastasia Kartasheva, 
Sebastien Pougct, Stcian Ruenzi, Chip Ryan, Rajeeva Sinha, 
Sanjay Srivastava, Peter Tufano, and Dimitri Vayanos for 
valuable comments. Michuel 0' Donnell and Xiangjing \IVci 
provided excellent research assistcmce. f. R. Kale acknowl­
edges support frmn the Research Program Council and 
Lhc H. Talmage Dobbs, Jr., Ch01ir in Finance. A. Subrama­
nian ackno\".:ledges support from the Risk Management and 
Insurance Educational Foundation at the f. Mack Robinson 
Hu et al.: Fund Flows, Pe~formance, ,\1a nagerial Career Conccrns, and RiskTabng 
Management Sciencl' 57(4), pp. 628-646, @2011 INFORMS646 
College of Business Administration at Georgia Stale Univer­
sity. The authors are responsible for all errors. 
References 
Berk, J. B., R. C Green. 2004. Mutual fund flow~ and performance 
in rational markets. f. Political t:corwm. 112(6) 1269-1295. 
Brown, K. C., W. V Harlow, L. T. Starks. 1996. Of tournaments 
and temptations: An analysis of managerial incentives in the 
mutual fund indu>try. J. Finance 51(1) 85-110. 
Tlusse, J. 2001. Another look at mt1tua 1 fund tournaments. J. Finan­
cial Quanl. Anal. 36(1 ) 53-73. 
Carpenter, J. N. 2000. Does option compensation increase manage­
rial risk appetite? f. Finance 55(5) 2311 2331. 
Chevalier, J., G. Ellison. 1997. Risk taking by mutual funds as a 
response to incentives. f. Political Ecanom. 105(6) ll67-1200. 
Chevalier, J., C. Ellison. 1999. Career concerns of mutual hmd man­
agers. Q uart . J. Econom. 114(2) 389-432. 
Dangl, T., Y. Wu, J. Zechner. 2008. Market discipline and internal 
gov erna nce in the mutual iund. industry Rev. Financial Stud. 
21(5) 2307-2343. 
Das, S. R., R K. Sundaram. 2002. Fee speech: Signaling, risk­
sharing, and. the impact of fee stmctures on investor welfare. 
Rev. financial Stud. 15(5).1465-1497. 
Del 	Guercio, D., P. A. Tkac. 2002. The determinants of the flow 
of funds of managed portfolios: Mutual funds versus pension 
funds. I- financial Quant. Anal. 37(4) 523-557. 
\ 
I: Gervais, S., A W. Lynch, D. K. Musto. 2005. Fund families us del­
egated monitors o£ money managers. &v. 1inancial Stud. 18(4) 
ll19-ll69. 
Heinkel, R., N. l'v1. Stoughton. 19Y4. 'l11e dynamics of portfolio man­
agement contracts. Rrv. Financial Stud. 7(2) 351- -387. 
Hodder, j., .1. Jackwerth. 2007. Incentive contracts and hedge fund 
management. j. financial Quant. ll.na/. 42(4) 811-826. 
TTua ng, L C. Sialm, IT. Zhang. 2011. Risk shifting and mutual fund 
perform<mce. Reo. Fin ancial Stud. f-orthcoming. 
Kempf, 	A., S. Rucnzi. 2008. Tournaments in mutual ftmd families. 
Rev. Fin;mi::ial. S.tud. 21(2) 1013-1036. 
Kempf, i\., S. Rucnzi, T. Thiele. 2009. Employment risk, com­
pensation incentives, and managerial rrsk-taking: Evidence 
from the mutual fund industry. f. Financial Econom. 92(1) 
92-108. 
Khurana, A 1996. Top management turnover: An empirical inves­
tigation of mutual fund managers. f. Fin ancial Econmn. 40(3) 
403-427. 
Khorana, A. 2001. Performance changes following top management 
turnover: Evidence from open-end mullti\l ftmds. ]. Financial 
Quant. Anal. 36(3) 371~393. 
Ou-Yang, TT. 20o:l. Optimal contracb in a continuous-time dele­
gated portfolio m<magemcnt p rqblcm. Rev. Finan cial Stud. 16(1) 
l73-20R. 
Rogers, vV. 1994. Regre~sion standard errors in clustered samples. 
Stata lech. Bull. 13(3) 19-23 . 
Sirri, F. R, P. Tufano. 1998. Costly search and mutual fund flows. 
]. .hmmce 53(5) 1.589-1622. 
